In this text I will explain the definitions of dualism and materialism and what the terms imply. I will then move on to Descartes, his dualism and the interaction problem arising from his philosophy. I will also introduce several different points of view that have arisen in response to materialist philosophy of mind. In addition, I will discuss the relationship between being conscious within monistic viewpoints, and being conscious within dualistic viewpoints.
First of all, I shall briefly consider the terms reductionism and physicalism. Reductionism is the idea that all theories or phenomena can be reduced to another theory or another phenomenon. Today, consciousness-reductionism is mostly about being able to reduce psychological and cognitive phenomena to physical phenomena, which I will go into in more depth later on in the text. (Ney, n.y) Physicalism is a philosophical position that says that literally everything is reducible to something physical. More sophisticatedly, it also says that everything can be metaphysically implied by the physical. The latter implies that it is impossible that there can be a world where the physical conditions and the facts are like our own, but which is not the case regarding the mental. (Hansen, 2018.)
Now that I have said a bit about reductionism, let’s look a bit at the definition of dualism and materialism. First, I will go through the definition of dualism as we know it today. Dualism essentially means “two-part” or “the idea of the two-part”, and mainly deals with the idea that body and mind are two different substances. Within philosophy there are several versions of dualism, such as Plato’s two-world dualism and Descartes’ two-substance dualism, which I will get into more later. (Calef, n.y) More precisely, dualism would mean an understanding of consciousness as a separate existence independently of the material world, where neither of these two entities is reducible to the other. This explanation draws from Descartes’ two-substance dualism, and before him, Plato’s two-world dualism.
Plato believed that there were two worlds that existed; the world of ideas and the world of things. In the world of ideas only ideas and thoughts exist, outside of time and space. Here there are e.g mathematics, the human soul and all ideas about the substances in the world of things. In the world of things, all physical substances exist, with their quantitative and qualitative properties. Here there are e.g. the human body, sand and stone, plants and animals, etc. Plato’s dualism implies that the soul, as in consciousness, exists in the world of ideas, outside of the substance, as in the human body. That before we were born the soul knew everything, and all ideas were open and understandable for the soul. It is only when the soul was bound to the body that all insight and understanding of the ideas disappeared from the soul.
This is what Descartes took inspiration from when he developed his own approach dualism and the distinction between body and soul. Descartes’ concept of substance says that the mind, as in the soul, and matter, as in the body, are two different substances. Metaphysically, this creates an interaction problem, which I will get into later in the text. Like Plato, Descartes has his own two-world model, where the mind is separate from the body. The two-world model of Descartes distinguishes between the thinking, res cogitans and the extended, res extensa. He also exercises his methodical doubt on the very existence of both substances, which I will explain in more detail later. (Strømholm, Bangu & Cahill, 2018, p.196)
Now that we’ve looked at dualism, let’s look a bit at its counterpart in philosophy of mind; materialism. Materialism is a monistic school of philosophy, where monism means “one” or “the thought of the one”. All substances are then considered to be reducible to each other. It is the idea that there is one world, namely the physical, and that all processes, phenomena and manifestations can is explained as a product of interactions between matter. Within a purely materialistic framework of understanding one thinks that all science can be explained as the result of changes, for example attraction and repulsion within the mechanism between the smallest constituents. Based on materialism, it is then believed that all brain activity is objectively measurable and quantifiable, and that a mapping of all brain activity is sufficient to explain what consciousness is. (Alnes, 2017)
Now that we have looked at both dualism and materialism, I will now go one step further and consider Descartes’ dualism and his problem of interaction. Descartes had a two-substance dualism where he divided the world into two, the extended, which he called Res Extensa, and the thinking, which he called Res Cogitans. Res extensa had a physical form with quantitative properties that were causally determined. While res cogitans had a thinking quality that was not causally determined and lacked material properties. Yet another distinction between them is that the extended exists in time and space, while the thinking does not. Regarding res extensa, Descartes believed that the qualitative characteristics such as colour, smell, taste, etc. were not sufficient enough to prove that a material substance existed. This is because he meant the sense impressions, or the interpretations of them, can deceive us into believing something that is not the case. According to Descartes, these dimensions of properties are purely subjective and non-measurable. Therefore, they are also considered secondary qualities. (Strømholm, Bangu &
Cahill, 2018, p.196) For example, if one sees three humanoid figures on a bridge off in the horizon, one assumes that there are three people crossing the bridge. But when you get closer you can realize that it were only remnants of some wood from the storm the day before. In such cases, the senses do not provide evidence us a good enough basis for certain knowledge. Now we have talked about res extensa, so now we move on to res cogitans. But how can one be sure that this res cogitans actually exists?
Descartes had two ways of proving this on; The Cogito Argument and the God Principle. The cogito argument is based on the methodical, radical doubt of Descartes. He meant that one can doubt absolutely everything, even one’s own existence. But he noticed that if he doubted the idea of something, the very doubt of something was an idea that could be doubted. But if one tries to disprove one’s own doubt, by doubting it, one already proves what one was trying to disprove. Thus he arrived at the famous expression; Cogito, ergo Sum. I think, therefore I am. Starting from the Cogito argument, Descartes first addressed the fact that God exists and that God, by definition, is perfect in every way. God is also the source of everything, including my own existence. Since God is perfect in every way, he himself cannot be besides existence. Thus he exists. In addition, since he is perfect in every way, has He has no desire to deceive us. Thus I exist and do not experience mere illusions. (Strømholm, Bangu & Cahill, 2018, p.199)
Now that we have looked at Descartes’ dualism and his definitions of substance, I will now explain the biggest problem that arises with his philosophy; Descartes’ interaction problem. Descartes’ interaction problem deals with the actual interaction between the human the body, res extensa, and the soul, res cogitans. According to Descartes, the body is a materialist substance that has physical extension with quantitative properties in time and space, while the soul exists apart from time, space and extension, but has a thinking quality. Since there are two of them different substances, they are not reducible to each other, and thus cannot interact or influence each other in any way. Nevertheless, one can witness for oneself that there is a kind of cause- effect between them. That when I have a thought to write something, and the will wants it, the hand picks up the pencil, presses it down against the sheet and writes the words on the paper. Or if I place my bare hand over an open flame for too long, the hand is drawn to me. Then flows the pain to the area that was touched by the flame (Skirry, n.y).
Descartes explained this connection with a specific part of the brain, which according to Descartes was indivisible. According to Descartes, this part of the brain was exclusive to humans, since animals lack a consciousness equivalent to that of humans. What was called the pineal gland was working as the link between the soul and the body, and could send and receive signals between them. In recent times, Descartes’ explanation has been shown to be wrong, and what is known as the epiphysis i day, is actually a gland that is mainly responsible for secreting the hormone melanin i the body. (Jansen, 2018)
So far I have gone through dualism, materialism and Descartes’ interaction problem. As we see there are two very different views of what consciousness is. Finally, I will deal with several different philosophical approaches to the problem of consciousness. I will also discuss the relationship between what it is to be conscious for each side of them. And to begin with shall I deal with eliminative materialism.
Eliminative materialism is the idea that there is no consciousness that needs to be resolved. Eliminativists believe that experience and experience do not correspond to consciousness, and that consciousness only is a philosophical construct. They believe that consciousness is a stream of perception, experiences, assessments and choices. In his view, consciousness is a by-product of Darwinism. That those who adapted best to their own environment were those who developed a higher sense of consciousness than their own co-individuals. The brain structure is thus a direct result of natural selection, and that the whole the brain as a unit and the interaction between its various parts is the cause of our awareness. There is therefore no awareness to worry about, says Daniel J. Dennett. (Weisberg, n.y)
Dennett has contributed to this philosophy by developing what is called the Multiple Drafts Model (MDM). This theory assumes that all mental activity that occurs in the brain runs in parallel processes of interpretation, all of which are under regular audit. MDM indicates that it does not there are some internal spectators who are ourselves, but that consciousness is a kind of narrative construction which develops over time (Gennaro, n.y). Dennett is also a clear opponent of the clear distinction that is often drawn between conscious and unconscious states. Something that Dennett is also opposed to is the idea of qualia, as I shall go into a little more detail later.
A similar direction that emphasises more the human mental states, focuses more on what these states do, rather than what they are, and is called functionalism. What makes one of these the mental states, such as joy, pain, sadness and happiness, of a thought, is what role they play in the cognitive system. (Levin, 2018) Functionalism contrasts with identity theory, which I will get into later.
Functionalism believes that, although it is what are called the C fibers in the brain that trigger a mental state of pain, there are other things that trigger the same state in others biological individuals. The same applies to all mental states in humans, computers, or other imaginary bodies with corresponding consciousness. An example of a functionalist approach to consciousness was developed by Bernard Baars, and is called Global Workspace Theory.
Global Workspace Theory (GWT) is a theory that sees the brain as a kind of blackboard, which acts as a global workplace for all processes in the brain. According to GWT, competing unconscious and conscious mental states to keep the “light of attention”. It is in this “the light of attention” that information is broadcast globally to all processes in the brain. This is where awareness is maintained, in such broadcasting. So according to this theory it can be said that consciousness is the actual global access to certain bits of information in the brain and the nervous system. (Gennaro, n.y).
But one of the criticisms against this theory is that it does not really address that of consciousness “difficult problem”, but rather the “easier” phenomena surrounding it. But here you can go even deeper, which Johan Fredrik Storm has done. As a neuroscientist, he has used the latest 40 years of mapping the effect each individual molecule has on the rest of the cognitive the network. Storm himself says in an interview with Morgenbladet, that you can change a single amino acid in one single cell, and already see a change in the behavior of the individual. (Time, 2017)
Which takes us to machine functionalism, which is based on ordinary functionalism. Here it is also meant that one can recreate or imitate human consciousness in a computer program, since all mental states are, in theory, functions of human behavior, assessments and thoughts. (Levin, 2018) Here, Alan Turing is considered the inventor of the modern interpretation of artificial intelligence. He developed a thought experiment for precisely the latter; The Turing Test.
The Turing test is a thought experiment where a machine’s ability to think and communicate is tested on trial. The experiment deals with two people and one computer, separated from each other by three room, and the only thing they have to communicate with each other is a computer. If humans are unable to distinguish between machine and human through conversation with each them, it implies that the machine has human cognition. (Dictionary.com, 2012)
Inspired by this thought experiment is “the chinese room” thought experiment, created by John Searle. This thought experiment involves a single person who does not speak Chinese, locked in a room. While in the room, he is dealt cards with Chinese symbols on them a hole in the wall, to which he must answer with a corresponding card. The only thing he has to determine which is the correct card, is an instruction that shows what he should answer to each symbol. This person does not understand Chinese, and yet he manages to answer Chinese input correctly Chinese output (Hauser, n.y).
This argument has two main points; the brain is the origin of the mind and structure does not replace contents. The target of this argument is what Searle calls “Strong AI”, which it contrasts with “Weak AI”. According to Searle, “Strong AI” is a computer program that is able to emulate human understanding and mental states with an associated intention. “Weak AI” means a computer program that only simulates human cognition, and does not really think and understand. (Hauser, n.y) But there is a counterargument to functionalism, which is identity theory.
According to functionalism, there is a direct relationship between the neural activity and the very state of consciousness. Identity theory uses this logic, counter-arguing that if you removed the part of the brain that perceives pain in the body, and you influence it the brain after it is removed, it will still cause the body to feel pain, even though it does not is in contact with the brain. In the same vein, the theory also suggests that the body would not know either pain if it did not have the pain center in the brain (Khan, 2017).
Now that we have looked at the monistic-materialist views of consciousness, we will now look at what it is to be conscious on the opposite side. Here I will talk about quality and finally; panpsychism.
Qualia, or Qualia, are seen as the qualitative characteristics of our own experiences experiences. That is to say, feeling the taste of food, hearing music and feeling the wind hair has its own dimension of experience that exists as much as other reducibles properties of consciousness. This argument about qualia creates difficulties for materialist-reductionist theories, since qualia are not considered to be reducible. Thus it cannot therefore be reduced to another either psychological or neurological phenomenon (Kind, n.y). In addition, absent qualia also serves as an argument against physicalism.
This argument was first introduced by Ned Block, and is best explained by his thought experiment on it the humanoid robot. Let’s say we bring a bunch of people together in a big network. These people can only communicate together with radio signals. Each one of them then plays a causal role as a neuron in a neural network, and functions as a reflection of the neural the network in a human brain. This network is then arranged so that it is functionally identical to man. Intuitively, it would be strange to assign this robot qualia. It will also be strange to assume that this one the robot has any mental experience at all, such as the feeling of pain or pleasure. But if this robot manages to operate identically to a human, this is proof that Qualia does not form part of a functionalist explanation of consciousness. That means we can have functional equivalence without qualitative equivalence (Kind, n.y).
One returns to the well-known phrase of Thomas Nagel; “What is it like to be a bat?”. IN his book of the same name (pages 435-450), he deals with the problem man has with understand what a bat’s experiences are like. Nagel believes that a human never ever comes to understand a bat’s subjective experiences and experiences. Not even if we operated our arms into wings, blinded ourselves, changed our vocal cords, spent the rest of our life in a cave by day and in the forest by night. And hypothetically, if it had been possible, we would still learn something new the day we became a bat. (Nagel, 1974)
This is purely on the basis that the consciousness of something existing, mainly animals and humans, but also possibly extraterrestrials, has an element of pure subjectivity. One element that is different for each individual, and can never be understood by another’s consciousness. The same principle also applies to other people. Although we took over another person their life and lived like them, we would never understand what it is like to be that person.
Now that I have talked about qualia, I will now talk about panpsychism. Panpsychism is the philosophy that everything has some form of consciousness or something resembling consciousness. In in this case, most panpsychists would refer to “everything” as literally every part of each and every substance. Panpsychists see the human consciousness as a unique, well constructed instance of a somewhat more universal concept. Their argument is that all things in it physical, reducible world, has a consciousness, but that there are increasing degrees of consciousness. For example, insects have a higher degree of consciousness than rocks, and cats have a higher one degree of consciousness than insects (Skrbina, u.to).
A theory that supports this panpsychic view is called integrated information theory and became developed by Gioliu Tononi. He defines the brain as a system for distribution, storage and processing of information. In principle, the same definition can be applied to the brain’s smallest reducible parts, namely the atom. An atom can be defined in the same way, but has a much less sophisticated structure than the brain.
Tononi has then also created a measurable unit, phi, where everything that has a value of phi above zero, have some form of consciousness. (Tononi, 2012) From panpsychism, I now turn to talk about the “zombie argument”. Within philosophy of consciousness, it is argued that “zombies” exist, on the simple basis that it is conceivable. A “zombie” here means an invented creature, both physically and behaviorally is exactly like us humans, but lacks consciousness. David Chalmers has argued in favor of this argument by referring to Ned Blocks' thought experiment about the human-like robot.
Let’s say that this robot was not an impossibility, and that the neurons in the brain were replaced by small people who spoke over the radio, and it is physically identical to a human. Would this robot be conscious? Intuitively, it feels right to answer no, and according to Chalmers, this is in itself an indication that it is not inconceivable that zombies exist. According to Tononi, one can measure the consciousness of any human being with the phi value. The higher the phi value you have, the more conscious you are. If a significant difference is found between supposed automatons and conscious humans, it also proves that dualism is a reality. If the existence of zombies is a reality, it would imply that consciousness is not a product of pure physicalism. It also implies that some form of dualism is explanatory correct regarding the existence of consciousness. (Kirk, 2015).
Taking this text as a reference, it is safe to say that consciousness is a heavily debated topic. On the one hand, one can draw the conclusion that consciousness or the experience of being conscious is a purely subjective experience, which cannot be reproduced or reduced to other physical phenomena. On the other hand, it is believed that one only needs to map and explore the brains properties, functions and structures to understand consciousness. One can also say that there is no consciousness as a separate substance, but that competing mental processes and natural selection are the origin of this inner the narrator’s voice. What we can safely say is that there is no shortage of opinions and theories when it comes to the most universal for all people, namely consciousness.
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